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'IRADING SYSTEM
Law and Policy of International Economic Relations

John H. Jackson
The following article is an edited excerpt from The World Trading System:
Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, published recently by the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Reprinted with permission.

The Policy Assumptions of the
International Economic System
"Liberal Trade"
The starting point for any discussion of policy for the international economic system
of today is the notion of "liberal trade," meaning the goal to minimize the amount of
interference of governments in trade flows that cross national borders. The economic
arguments concerning this central policy concept will be discussed below, but regardless of their validity or intellectual persuasiveness, there is no question that they have
been influential. The basic "liberal-trade" philosophy is constantly reiterated by government and private persons, even in the context of a justification for departing from it!
The prominent economist, Paul Samuelson, says, "[T]here is essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is an exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free
trade promotes a mutually profitable division of labor, greatly enhances the potential
real national product of all nations, and makes possible higher standards of living all
over the globe."
Of course, this basic "economic goal" is not the only goal of international trade
policy. A number of other goals can be articulated also. In some cases these other
goals may be partly inconsistent with the central goal, requiring some "balancing"
or "compromise." At least two more can be mentioned here.
During the years near the end and just after World War II, as leaders of the victorious nations began formulating post-war plans for international economic institutions,
one could detect in speeches and documents a strong political goal that accompanied
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the economic thinking of the day. The political goal stemmed from thinking that
pointed to the interwar economic problems as partial causes for the disastrous Second
World War. The Great Depression, the mishandling of policy toward Germany after
World War I, and similar circumstances weighed heavily on the minds of policy makers
who wanted to design post-World War II institutions that would prevent a recurrence of
these problems. For example, Harry Hawkins of the U.S. said in a 1944 speech, "Trade
conflict breeds noncooperation, suspicion, bitterness. Nations which are economic enemies are not likely to remain political friends for long." A 1945 presidential message
stated that "The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each
other for wealth and power, or work together for security and mutual advantage. . . .
The experience of cooperation in the task of earning a living promotes both the habit
and the techniques of common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence
on which the peace depends."
Another policy underlying contemporary international economic rules and institutions became more prominent in more recent decades. This is the policy of promoting
economic development in those countries which were not industrialized at the end of
World War II. Many of the corollaries of this policy goal appear to challenge the appropriateness of rules and institutions assumed to be desirable for general "liberal trade"
goals, and this development goal has led some leaders to question the fairness of the
economic institutions established during the 1940s.

~

~

The Level Playing Field as a Policy Goal
In connection with international trade policy, one often hears expressed the importance of the "level playing field."
The meaning and implications of this goal are anything but clear. To a certain degree
it may imply preserving a competitive market atmosphere for world trade, just as some
large societies (notably the U.S.) have such a goal for their internal markets. Thus,
when foreign governments intervene in the world market to favor their own national
objectives, or foreign manufacturers engage in various noncompetitive practices, these
activities are thought to be unfair to competing producers in other countries.
But often something more is meant by the "level playing field" idea. Even "economically competitive" actions by foreign firms are considered in some cases to be
"unfair," and thus to disturb the "level playing field." Certain categories of actions
have for many decades been considered to be "unfair" by nations and the international
rules of international trade. Among these are "dumping" and "subsidy'' activities, as
well as other actions, including patent, trademark, or copyright infringements. It is not
always clear whether all the practices subsumed by trade policy experts under these
categories really have a damaging impact on a world trading system, or whether they
provide for uneven conditions of competition for producing firms in other nations.
Yet the goal of promoting a "level playing field," through national and international
policies designed to inhibit dumping or subsidies, seems to have a powerful
political appeal.

International Law and International
Economic Relations: An Introduction
International Economic Law
Increasingly in recent years one has heard references to "international economic
law." Unfortunately, this phrase is not well defined. Various scholars and practitioners
have differing ideas about the meaning of this term. Some would have it cast a very
wide net, and embrace almost any aspect of international law that relates to any sort of
economic matter. Considered this broadly, almost all international law could be called
international economic law, because almost every aspect of international relations
touches in one way or another on economics. Indeed, it can be argued from the latter
observation that there cannot be any separate subject denominated as "international
economic law."

Trade conflict breeds noncooperation, suspicion,
bitterness. Nations which are
economic enemies are not
likely to remain political
friends for long.
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The subject of international
trade, whether in goods or
in services (or both), is
clearly at the core of international economic law.

A more restrained definition of "international economic law" would, however,
embrace trade, investment, services when they are involved in transactions that cross
national borders, and those subjects that involve the establishment on national territory
of economic activity of persons or firms originating from outside that territory.
In any event, the subject of international trade, whether in goods or in services (or
both), is clearly at the core of international economic law. The rules of product trade,
centrally served by the GATT, are the most complex and extensive international rules
regarding any subject of international economic relations which exist. As such it is
natural that they would have some influence on the potential development of rules for
other international economic subjects. Already scholars and statesmen have mentioned
a "GATT for Investment" and a "GATT for Services." For this reason there is considerable justification for focusing on the rules of product trade as they are reflected in the
GATT system. This focus can be thought of as sort of a "case study" of the advantages
and disadvantages, the positives and negatives, of an elaborate rule system at the
international level.
There are two unfortunate bifurcations of the subject of international economic law,
however. One is the distinction between monetary and trade affairs. Since both are, in a
sense, "two sides of the same coin," there is a degree of artificiality in separating them
as topics. Yet international organizations •. national governments, and even university
departments tend to indulge in the same separation, and since the whole world cannot
be studied at once, there is great practical value in taking up the trade questions
separately.
An even less fortunate distinction of subject matter is often made between international and domestic rules. In fact, domestic and international rules and legal
institutions of economic affairs are inextricably intertwined. It is not possible to understand the real operation of either of these sets of rules in isolation from the other. The
national rules (especially constitutional rules) have had enormous influence on the international institutions and rules. Likewise the reverse influence can often be observed.
Consequently I shall try to treat them both.

The Tangled Web:
Is There a Warp and a Woor?
Legal scholars sometimes refer to the "seamless web" of the law. The phrase connotes the notion that each legal concept is in some way related to virtually every other
legal concept. It also connotes a certain skepticism of theory and of simplifying concepts - a skepticism which in many ways is characteristic of the legal profession,
which often views itself as uniquely, among the learned professions, coming face to
face with the complexity and coarseness of reality with the·aim of solving real problems. It is sometimes said that the economist tells us what should be done, while the
lawyer is left to figure out how to do it. This brings to mind the anecdote of the person
on a desert island who finds a can of vegetables and asks the theorist how to open it.
"Use a can opener," the theorist replies. "But where do I find one?" asks the other
castaway. "Don't bother me with details!" responds the theorist.
The converse problem can also be dangerous: there is always the risk of losing sight
of the forest because one's gaze focuses on particular trees. Watch a lawyer and a social
scientist argue. The lawyer often cites specific cases - the "anecdotal evidence" to make his point. The social scientist, on the other hand, will often use statistics to
make his point. There are dangers with each approach. In order to formulate statistics
it is often necessary to develop categories for counting which are over-simplified.
The specific case history can be a useful way to avoid this kind of oversimplification.
On the other hand, the use of anecdotes can often seriously mislead policy makers.
"Once does not make always"; the anecdotes may be atypical.
Thus, we are faced with a dilemma. How can some meaningful generalizations be
stated in the short space allotted for exposition of an extraordinarily complex subject?
There is always the danger of an apparently "unifying hypothesis" seriously oversimplifying the subject and thereby misleading the policy-maker and problem-solver. Yet
without some generalization it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the subject.
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Perhaps one way out of this difficulty is to state issues or questions raised by the material without in all cases trying to formulate answers. I have tried to do a little of both.

Conclusions and Perspectives
The "Trade Constitution"
What we may characterize as the "constitution" for international trade relations in
the world today is a very complex mix of economic and governmental policies, political constraints, and above all (from my perspective) an intricate set of constraints
imposed by a variety of "rules" or legal norms. It is these legal norms which provide
the skeleton for the whole system. Attached to that skeleton are the softer tissues of
policy and administrative discretion. Even the skeleton is not rigid or always successful
in sustaining the weight placed upon it. Some of the "bones" bend and crack from time
to time. And some of the tissues are unhealthy.
This "constitution" imposes different levels of constraint on the policy options available to public or private leaders. Some of its "rules" are virtually immutable. Others
can be changed more easily. Part of the complexity of the whole system is this variety
of constraints, which limit the realistically available options for solving problems.
In addition, there are different contexts or levels for these constraining rules. Some
of these constraints come from national or sovereign-state governmental systems
(e.g., the Constitution of the United States, or the statutes of a GATT member country).
Other rules come from the international system and its treaty mosaic, centering for our
purposes on the GATT system, but also influenced by other elements of the Bretton
Woods system and indeed the entire structure of international law (weak as it may be).
Some of these "constitutional" restraints are sources of great annoyance both to decision-makers and to economists. The rules, they will sometimes say, too often "get in
the way." Indeed, with respect to the "trade constitution," they are probably right. As
I will explain, there is considerable reason to be discontented with that "constitution"
as it exists today, and to worry about its weaknesses and defects in the context of the
type of interdependent world with which we are faced.
However, some of the constraints are the result of important and necessary principles, resulting from competing policy goals of the total system (not just those of
international trade). For example, there is no doubt that the U.S. constitutional "separation of powers" principles are the source of great annoyance for decision-makers,
who must struggle with the constant tensions of the executive-Congress power struggles. Yet the great genius of the draftsmen of this Constitution was their understanding
of the need to disperse power so as to avoid its abuse. Thus, in a broader context, the
separation-of-powers principle can be seen to have greater importance than the needs
for short-term solutions to disagreeable international economic and trade problems.
Likewise, a rule-oriented structure of the portion of the skeleton devoted to international treaties for trade (GATT) is often a source of annoyance and aggravation. Yet
that rule structure itself has potential value for creating greater predictability, redressing unfair power imbalances, and preventing escalating international tensions. In some
instances it is more important that international disputes be settled quietly and peacefully than that they conform to all correct economic policy goals, although the longterm impact of a "settlement" on the rule structure must also be considered.
Like almost all government activity, the international trading system and its constitution contain conflicting and competing policy goals. Thus, like most government
institutions, methods of resolving or "compromising" these competing goals are crucial to the potential long-range success of the system. For example, the worthy
objectives of liberal trade (based on economic principles such as comparative advantage) will often conflict (at least in the short run) with goals of protecting poorer or
weaker parts of a society's citizenry. Thus, the " pureness" of liberal trade policies is
relaxed somewhat to accommodate some competing goals of helping those who are
poorer to adjust. (Of course, the constitutional structure of the system sometimes
perversely also assists the more privileged of the world's producers to perpetrate that
privilege at the expense of others - merely illustrating one of the many imperfections

There is considerable reason
to be discontented with the
"trade constitution" as it
exists today, and to worry
about its weaknesses and
defects in the context of the
type of interdependent world
with which we are faced.
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in the system.) The "conservative social welfare function" so ably described by Max
Corden realistically explains the approach of many national governments in today's
world. Even if Corden and his admirers (including me) do not always think that this
function is wisely administered, yet it can be defended in some circumstances as an
appropriate governmental goal which also competes with purer versions of liberal
trade policy.
With these observations we can now see some approaches to solving various trade
puzzles. How vulnerable is a small country to blocking by other nations of the small
country's exports? At the moment almost the only recourse or inhibition of such an action by importing nations is the GATT system. Defective as it is, it nevertheless plays a
crucial role in constraining some of the more rampant national governmental actions
which would otherwise restrict trade and defeat important expectations of small (and
large) exporting countries.
Likewise, the investor who needs some long-term dependability of export markets
in order for his new plant to be a viable investment will also find the GATT system
crucial (and not necessarily too comforting!). Without this system, the degree of predictability would be even considerably less.
Why do governments choose fourth-best economic policy options? The intricate
interplay of international rules and national constitutions and norms gives us the
necessary clues. National executives prefer to avoid going to Congress or parliaments
in order to obtain the necessary authority for certain approaches, and this may rule
out some options. The international rules provide in some circumstances the onus of
"compensation" or rebalancing of negotiated benefits, which impose constraints. Thus
governments may pursue "informal" measures or other approaches which are less advantageous in economic terms in order to avoid some of the national or international
rule-imposed "costs" of particular actions. The use of export-restraint arrangements
particularly comes to..mind.

The worthy objectives of
liberal trade (based on
economic principles such as
comparative advantage) will
often conflict (at least in the
short run) with goals ofprotecting poorer or weaker
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parts of a society's citizen~

~
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How the System Works
We can now summarize, or at least characterize, how the world's "trade constitution" works, such as it is. This system is a complex interplay of both national and
international norms, institutions and policies. It cannot be understood if only the international part is studied, nor can it be understood if only the sovereign national states
are studied. The linkages are extremely significant: the GATT is what it is at least
partly because of the United States constitutional structure and, more recently, because
of the structure of the European Community. U.S. law is what it is at least partly because of the GATT. To explore how to achieve certain policy options, one must know
not only the GATT procedures for the rule formulation or treaty change, but also the
similar procedures of at least some of the key nation-state GATT members.
Within major GATT trading nations, a cardinal principle of the administrating (executive) authorities is often to avoid seeking legislation from the legislature. Thus the
constitutional allocation of powers, embellished by existing legislation, often produces
significant constraints on policy selection.
A core part of the system is the vast body of GATT tariff bindings, made significant
and relatively enforceable because of the GATT and its institutional makeup. An additional part of the system (perhaps less effective) is the code of conduct established
by the many other GATT rules and for at least some nations extended by the various
"side codes" of the GATT.
Important additions to the system come from national government laws and
institutions, particularly those relating to "unfair trade practices." In many cases
national procedures provide for initiation of complaints by private entrepreneurs, and
various nations have rules that differ in the extent to which government officials are
"mandated" to carry out certain actions, or have discretion to choose among various
possibilities. We have seen that, at least for dumping and subsidy countermeasures, the
U.S. Congress has strongly pushed the U.S. law in the direction of mandatory import
restraints, and this is posing certain threats to the liberal trade policies of the system.
Part of the congressional impetus for this approach is the distrust by the Congress of
executive-branch handling of trade policy in the past, but also some of the impetus

stems from the natural proclivity of members of Congress to please particular
constituents.
All in all, however, the system does work; or perhaps it would be better to say that
the GAIT system operates better than anyone had reason to expect, given the uncertain
beginnings and the various gaps in this "trade constitution."

Weaknesses of the "Trade Constitution"
Although it works (sort of), there is plenty of reason for much of the concern
expressed about this system. What are these concerns?
Most fundamental (and perhaps most difficult to remedy) is the basic constitutional
infirmity of the GAIT as a treaty and an organization. It was never intended to be what
it has become, and as we have seen, the GAIT has become what it is largely through
an evolutionary and pragmatic adaptation to the role thrust upon it when the ITO failed
to come into being. This has meant that:
• Changes in the trade rules are hard to achieve; amending the GAIT is almost impossible, and so the trading nations have turned to other measures such as "side codes"
(which have some troublesome side effects) to establish changes in the trading rules.
• The GAIT membership is changing and expanding; different types of societies are
entering the GAIT fold, and some are still left out.
• Loopholes or lacunae in the GAIT rules have been troublesome, partly because of
the difficulty of changing GAIT rules.
• The GAIT has not yet manifested its ability to house amicably under its single roof
vastly different economic systems, including those called "nonmarket."
• Problems of agriculture trade have so far been intractable.
• Some urge the GAIT approach to be extended to areas of international economic
endeavor (such as trade in services) not heretofore covered by 'the GAIT system.
• Rule implementation has sometimes been troublesome in GATT, as a number of
nations avoid GAIT rules by subterfuge, exploiting lacunae in the rules, or merely
exercising their power.
• The procedures for dispute settlement have been heavily criticized and need
attention.
• Subsidy rules in particular have been a source of great confusion, disagreement,
and dissatisfaction.
• The GATT as an organization has probably not developed sufficiently to accomplish
all the responsibilities heaped upon it; in particular the secretariat may be
inadequate.
Not only the GAIT can be criticized, however. The laws and procedures of national
governments leave much to be desired. For example, in the United States there is much
ambiguity and potential for troublesome delay in situations when a GAIT dispute-settlement panel and procedure rules that the U.S. is obligated to change its law because of
GAIT rules. The Congress or the administration does not always efficiently implement
such international rulings, a fact which tends to induce other countries also to resist
such rulings and to generally reduce the respect for and predictability of the rules of
the trading system.
In the United States there is some concern about the inefficiency of the U.S. national
laws and procedures relating to "unfair trade practices," particularly those involving
dumping or subsidies. This concern includes worry that the procedures are cumbersome, slow, and very costly, in some cases becoming themselves barriers to liberal
trade among nations.
In addition, there is general concern about the functioning of the U.S. Congress. Its
vulnerability to narrow local constitutional interests and to certain powerful lobbies,
especially in the absence of strong presidential leadership, is a worry expressed by
many about the U.S. Constitution. The performance of the Congress in trying to shape
a trade bill during 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988 must be seen as evidence of the weakness of some of the congressional processes, confirming those worries.

The GATT has not yet manifested its ability to house
amicably under its single
roof vastly different
economic systems, including
those called "nonmarket."
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Concerns may also be expressed about the trade laws of other governments. The European Economic Community is in the process of an agonizing constitutional evolution
which sometimes renders its relations to the GATT system less than satisfactory from
the points of view of other nations.
Likewise, the influence of approaching national elections (and when is there none?)
on international trade policy and negotiations, especially in Europe, often raises worries similar to those about the U.S. Congress.
More could obviously be said, but we need to turn to some key policy questions.

Some Fundamental Policy Questions

A particularly fundamental
question, not often discussed, is the issue of what
techniques are appropriate

•

to "manage interdepende~

~

Clearly the implications of the preceding section are that considerable attention to
the basic constitutional structure of GATT is warranted. New mechanisms for rulemaking and rule evolution would be welcome, and these may require some sort of "steering
group" or other institution. Perhaps sometime governments will even be bold enough
to consider a new OTC-type charter - i.e., a brief treaty of only institutional measures
(not covering substantive obligations), such as that tried unsuccessfully during the
mid-1950s.
The dispute-settlement procedures are also under close scrutiny. The critical question of whether such procedures should be tilted toward a "rule orientation" or a
"power orientation" (or what should be the appropriate intermediate orientation) is still
unresolved . To what extent are governments today willing to submit to "rules" and to
rule-implementing procedures which effectively reduce the discretion of national officials? How far will governments trust dispute-settlement panels with "big issues" of
trade policy? Can a rule system at least partly serve to replace the hegemonic system
which many commentators suggest has been lost, as U.S. relative economic power has
declined?
A particularly fun@mental question, not often discussed, is the issue of what techniques are appropriate to "manage interdependence." Several alternative approaches
can be suggested:
• Harmonization, a system that gradually induces nations toward uniform approaches
to a variety of economic regulations and structures. An example would be standardization of certain product specifications. Another example would be uniformity of
procedures for applying countervailing duties or escape-clause measures.
• Reciprocity, a system of continuous "trades" or "swaps" of measures to liberalize (or
restrict) trade. GATT tariff negotiations follow this approach.
• Interface, which recognizes that different economic systems will always exist in the
world and tries to create the institutional means to ameliorate international tensions
caused by those differences, perhaps through buffering or escape-clause
mechanisms.
Obviously a mixture of all these techniques is most likely to be acceptable, but that
still leaves open the question of what is the appropriate mixture. For example, how
much should the "trade constitution" pressure nations to conform to some uniform
"harmonized" approaches, or is it better simply to establish buffering mechanisms that
allow nations to preserve diversity but try to avoid situations in which one nation imposes burdens (economic or political) on other nations?
Closely connected to this previous point is an issue which may be loosely characterized as similar to federalism. This is the issue about the appropriate allocation of
decision-making authority to different levels of government. Each federal nation faces
this question-Le., What is the appropriate allocation of power between the national
government and subordinate state or municipal governments? The international system
broadly, and the international trade system particularly, also face this question. As interdependence drives nations to more concerted action, there also arises the question of
whether a gradual drift of decision-making authority upward to international institutions is always best for the world. How much power do we want to delegate to such
international institutions? In what instances do we wish to preserve local or subordinate government control on the ground that such government is closer to the affected
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constituents? To what degree does a "harmonization" approach to managing interdependence unduly interfere with these federalist principles of maintaining decisionmaking closer to affected individuals and firms?
One very perplexing issue is that of the appropriate linkage of international economic policies and measures to "noneconomic" policies such as human rights, or to
geopolitical considerations.
There is an important policy issue in connection with the "trade constitution's" principles of nondiscrimination, particularly the MFN principle. It must be recognized that
MFN policies have some costs as well as benefits. Thus the question arises, in connection with many trade measures, whether MFN principles should be observed or not.
Closely related but not identical is the question of multilateralism versus bilateralism.
Which of these approaches best promotes the long-term interests of the system?
Within national governments there are also a number of fundamental policy issues
closely linked to the international "trade constitution." One of these is the degree to
which a legalistic and adversarial system (such as the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty systems) of administrating trade laws is best. A more legalistic or litigious
approach has its costs, including attorney and consultant fees, time delay, and government costs. On the other hand, it may in some situations provide better information to
decision-makers, allow interested parties to make their cases and give them the feeling
that they have had their "day in court," and avoid corruption through transparency.
Also pertaining to national governments is the question of the appropriate distribution of power to courts and administrative officials. What is the appropriate role of
courts in reviewing trade measures undertaken by administration officials? Should the
courts exercise great deference toward the administrators on the grounds of the courts'
relative lack of expertise and information-gathering techniques? Or will such deference
result in increasing abdication of judicial responsibilities to maintain fairness and completeness of decisions, as interdependence extends to more human endeavors?

Prospects and Worries
More than 40 years after the current world "trade constitution" was launched as part
of the immediate post-World War II Bretton Woods system, we still find that the central institution of this constitution is an organization which was not intended to be an
organization, a treaty that is yet only "provisionally" in force, and an incredibly complex, tangled web of international agreements and provisions modifying, explaining, or
escaping those agreements. That it works at all is truly surprising. Yet this GAIT system does work, and as I have said, it works considerably better than anyone had reason
to expect at the end of the 1940s.
But clearly it is defective. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, and
increasingly vulnerable to rapidly changing and rapidly transmitted economic forces, it
is impossible not to worry about the question of whether the "trade constitution" can
stand up to the stresses it is likely to face during the next few decades. One of the negotiating topics listed on the agenda for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations is the
"future of the GAIT system," or FOGS for short. Whether this or other endeavors can
succeed in time to bring into effect sufficient improvement in the "trade constitution"
as to avoid a worldwide economic disaster, no one can say for certain. Yet the reasonable but surprising success of the past few decades, based largely on pragmatic and
evolutionary problem-solving techniques, does give us some reason to be optimistic .
Let us hope, therefore, that the world's economic diplomats will be able to continue to
keep the system functioning. Let us also hope, however, that they can begin to develop
changes that will move the trade constitution, even if slowly, toward a system that is
not so vulnerable to short-term ad-hoc "fixes," but instead can establish the framework
for mutual international cooperation in a manner creating both the predictability and
stability needed not only for solid economic progress, but also for the flexibility necessary to avoid floundering on the shoals of parochial special national interests.
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